Shakespeare and Therapeutizing the “Naturall Sicknes” of Dreams in Reformed England*

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ABSTRACT

Situating the dreams of Cleopatra, Bottom and Caliban in the context of Elizabethan oneirology, medicine, politics, and the English Reformation, this paper argues that Shakespearean oneirotopias (dream topoi) reveal how deeply the Bard felt about contemporary emotional wellbeing, whether concerning an Alexandrine empress, a subaltern weaver or an inebriated “monster.” Elizabethans saw dreaming largely within martyrological, heretical, theological or utilitarianist discourses. Proto-medical texts of Galenic oneirology, drawn from Greek influences, gave a secondary position to dreams as dispensable and falsifiable residues of waking realities. Shakespeare’s dreamscape challenged the notion of dreams as a “naturall sicknes,” finding dramaturgical, aesthetic and psychotherapeutic roles for them. Seen in the light of the method of dream work devised by the psychotherapist Montague Ullman, the Shakespearean dreamscape elicits the anxieties of Elizabethan oneirology to trace and articulate the etiology of dreams, which it failed to wholly appropriate into either a divine (metaphysical) or anthropogenic (secular or materialistic) discourse. The Shakespearean stage operates as a meeting ground between private traumas and collectivized spectacle, legitimizing dream phenomena as perfectly natural and organic constituents of the processual sickness and health of the Renaissance mind, beyond Elizabethan cynicism and the Freudian model of dream censorship.

KEYWORDS: Shakespeare, Reformation, dreams, Renaissance, oneirology, Ullman

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I. The “Sicknes” of Dreams in Shakespeare’s England

Never has a psychic phenomenon so dominated a literary epoch as dreaming dominated dramaturgy in William Shakespeare’s England. This was not in spite of but due to the radical politics of the English Reformation, which revolved around the divorce and remarriage of Henry VIII, the promulgation of the Act of Supremacy in 1534, England’s severance of the Vatican’s papal authority, the establishment of the Anglican Church, and the religious feuds that ruled its aftermath.

The topos of Renaissance dreams has continued to puzzle and delight critics, as a fascinating region within the “whole vast continent . . . of the Elizabethan mind, the mind of Shakespeare’s audience and of Shakespeare himself, with its alchemical and astrological prepossessions, its demonology and its ghost lore, its barbarous medicine and its bizarre psychology” (Camden 107). We can only talk of the probable meanings that the Shakespearean dreamscape had for his audience, without generalizing an onirological theory. Shakespeare’s contemporaries often wrote of dreams—though much less significantly than him—only to undermine their psychological importance, preserving the zeitgeist’s cynicism. In Sapho and Phao (1584), John Lyly saw dreams as “dotings, which come either by things we see in the day, or meates that we ate” (Complete Works 406), while in Endymion (1588), his lead character is bewitched into a four-decade-long slumber, and the contents of the dream are left unreported (6-7). The surreal dreams of Lyly’s eponymic character Mother Bombie probably stemmed from the author’s euphuism or the ambivalent onirology of the age (Sivefors 191-92). Another contemporary, Thomas Nashe, is said to have offered one of the most “florid denunciations” of dreams (Bulkeley, Spiritual Dreaming 164) as “bubbling scum or froath of fancie” resulting from undigested elements of the day or a “feast made of the fragments of idle imaginations” (Nashe 234). Thomas Kyd warned, “We dreame by night what we by day haue thought” (250), and wrote in The Spanish Tragedy (circa 1580s) of “the Gates of Horn, / Where dreames have passage in the silent night” (133), alluding to the Greco-Roman standard which saw honest dreams as originating from gates of horn and false ones from gates of ivory. Renaissance taxonomies of “dreams, visions, and hallucinations were expressed in terms of the mind’s image-making faculty” as inherited from Aristotle, who related phantasmagorias to the “dreams of the melancholic, the feverish, and
the intoxicated,” and Galen, who believed fantasy to be “most developed in the case of people suffering from melancholy, phrenitis, or mania” (Roychoudhury 207-08).

Elizabethan oneirology and dramaturgy were both, at least partly, shaped by somber doubts concerning the reliability and prognosticative or theological permissibility of dreams, which thus tended to position dreaming more within the discourse of martyrological dogmas or evidence of treason rather than that of proto-scientific investigations. Not coincidentally, when Sigmund Freud had to choose a Renaissance stalwart for his Oedipal theory, he chose Shakespeare; yet, even Freud was stunningly indifferent to manifest dreams in the Shakespearean oeuvre (Hillman 104-06). Examining the Shakespearean dreamscape, we are faced with questions that have been asked for over four decades now: its relation to the evolution of dramaturgy (Fretz 8-15) and the place that dream phenomena occupy in the history of man (Garber 140). Going a step further, we examine the place of psychological healing in Shakespeare’s dreamscape.

How seriously Renaissance’s England took its “dreams” (or “dreames”) is evident from the Google Ngram of usage trends for the word, which shows two distinct peaks in the textual recording of the phenomenon: one between 1530 and 1540; another between 1590 and 1610 (see Fig. 1). The first gradient is strikingly steep, coinciding with the political, heretical and martyrological discourses of the Reformation; the second gradient is gradual and pervasive, and coincides with the career of Shakespeare.

Fig. 1. Google Ngram trends for “dream” (and “dreame”), 1500-2021.
Dreaming, dream reportage and theory were not simply heterogeneous; they were deeply contested and contradictory in Elizabethan England. King James I, who debunked several quacks and frauds—like the charlatan somniloquist oneiromancer and doctor Richard Haydock—continued to believe in witchcraft, while decrying the power of dreams. He strongly opposed the occult notion that daemonic forces were embodied in dreams. To him, dreams were “a naturall sicknes,” which medics had termed as *Incubus*, “because it being a thicke fleume, falling into our breast upon the harte, while we are sleeping, intercludes so our vitall spirites, and takes all power from us, as maks us think that there were some unnaturall burden or spirite, lying upon us and holding us downe” (James, *First Daemonologie* 69). King James advised his son Henry, the future Prince of Wales, to “take no heed of” dreams and prophecies (*Basilikon* 129). As a positive signifier of negative health, Renaissance physicians and oneirology agreed that dreams and nightmares were symptomatic of physiological diseases. Dreams were seen as pathological sites where physical and psychological maladies could be diagnosed. “Melancholie,” for instance, which for Elizabethans was both a disease and Galenic humour, was widely considered as the “mother of all dreames, and of all terrours of the night” (Nashe 238); it was the malady of those who “prophesy, and speak strange languages; whence comes their crudity, rumbling, convulsions, cold sweat, heaviness of heart, palpitation, cardiaca, fearful dreams, much waking, prodigious fantasies” (Burton 84). Political theology, on the other hand, saw seeds of heresy, treason, martyrrology, Catholic or Protestant ideology in dreams (Rivière 105-10; Levin 61-80). If unpopular theology was the recipe for macabre executions and revenge theatre in Elizabethan England, dreaming and dream reportage were key thresholds to such beliefs (Marshall 99; Mullaney 104-05). Against this backdrop, we reexamine three manifest dreams or dreamlike phenomena from the Shakespearean dreamscape—as reported by Nick Bottom, Cleopatra and Caliban—to show how the Bard challenged Renaissance oneirological dogmas. The three dreams underscore dreaming as a self-sustaining therapeutic principle, coming closer to twentieth-century psychotherapist Montague Ullman, and his method of group dream therapy or dream work (120-30), than Renaissance oneirology.

But what was the Renaissance theory of dreams like? Latin versions of Artemidorus’ book of dream interpretations *Oneirocritica* (circa 200 AD) and
Thomas Hill’s *The Pleasant Art of the Interpretations of Dreams* (1576), based on it, were widely available in Shakespeare’s England (Levin 35). Elizabethans were also told that “in sleep our phantasy can perceive those truths which are denied to it when we are awake, and it is the mind alone, not the senses, which is able to experience these things” (Camden 122). Shakespeare had a semi-sophisticated theory of dreams at his disposal as well as a preliminary notion of the present-day continuity hypothesis of dreaming, which postulates that waking experiences precondition dreams. But Shakespeare’s dreamscape subverts direct correlational links between waking and dreaming by situating the former as not the inverse or residue of reality but in a relationship of complementarity with the latter. It would have been near madness to represent Elizabethan dreams as anything but such stuff as madness is made of. And Shakespeare did precisely so. For him, dreams were not the stuff of madmen but *we* were “such stuff as dreams are made on,” as spoken by one of his players in a Parthian shot (3118). Probing how Shakespeare therapeutized dreaming—in an age of heretical, martyrological and theological monopoly over dream meanings—we study his dreamscape for clues that modern psychotherapy has been deploying, at least, since Ullman’s time. Recently, studies such as Jonathan Gil Harris’ historical-phenomenological analysis of an “archive of smell” in *Macbeth* and the Shakespearean stage (468), along with neuroscientific historiographies on Shakespeare’s conversance with strokes, paralyses, parapraxes, sleep apnea, epilepsy, dementia, encephalopathies and Parkinsonism,¹ have together broadened the scope of Renaissance dramaturgy as a source of information on social phenomenology and attitudes to disease. We are in a position to now inquire: was dreaming explicitly considered a disease in Shakespearean England? There is evidence to infer that, with or without their dangerous politico-theological ramifications, dream phenomena signified states of socio-biological unhealth to Elizabethan eyes, unless dreamed by monarchists (Queen Elizabeth’s controversial dreams symbolizing events in her sister Mary Stuart’s life, for instance) or someone dreaming on behalf of a monarch (like Calpurnia or the soothsayer from Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar*). Whether socially, biologically or politically, dreamers and dream reports were often regarded with ridicule, pity, concern, suspicion or alarm. However, by the beginning of the seventeenth century, English attitudes

¹ Please see Fogan 922-24; Mahon 335-70; Paciaroni and Bogousslavsky 3-18; Gomes 359-61.
to dreaming took a dramatic turn. As we will observe, a dramaturgical turn given by Shakespeare very likely had an affirmative effect therein.

In the following parts, we examine the place of dreams in Shakespearean England, followed by textual evidence from *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, *Antony and Cleopatra* and *The Tempest* to observe the therapeutic value that Bottom, Cleopatra and Caliban derive from dreaming, in correlation with the psychotherapeutic Ullman method. The critical discourses we consider here include: dreams as a socio-biological malady in Renaissance England; psychotherapeutic prototypes in early modern oneirology; and dreaming as a source of spiritual healing (in terms of theatrical affect and catharsis on the Elizabethan stage, as well as a personal psychological gift or a means of individuation).

**II. Elizabethan Oneirology and Ullman’s Dream Work**

Dreams from the Elizabethan stage offer a model of dream-within-dream (like *Hamlet’s* play within play or the various mock-dream sequences within *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*). For Elizabethan playwrights, dreams were metatheatrical tools that could substitute for classical conventions of staging ghosts or the cumbersome *deus ex machina*. Elizabethan dramatists diverged considerably from Platonic conventions, by eradicating distinctions between tragedy and comedy, experimenting with genre and improvisation, and substituting theatrical formalism with considerations of psychological and perceptual effects on the audience (Fretz 1-14). Eventually, changes in Elizabethan dramaturgy began to correlate with a new oneirological subculture. Since Shakespeare was a pioneer of several dramaturgical innovations, Shakespearean dreams can be benchmarked as a cognitive yardstick for the Elizabethan audience (Levin 130-40). Renaissance dreams in general—Shakespearean oneirology included—circumscribe a “historiography of dreaming” that challenges orthodox Tudor oneirology (Plane and Tuttle 928).

Shakespeare’s predecessors and contemporaries were indeed interested in dreams—often for the wrong reasons. It was rare to find the odd secular theory of dreaming, such as that of Levinus Lemnius, a Dutch physician, who equated dreams to palimpsests which resulted from earnest thoughts and desires of the waking mind before sleep (Fretz 5). Otherwise, much of the philosophy of dreaming was dominated by theology. John Foxe, the Protestant historian,
recorded several prophetic dreams in the *Book of Martyrs* (1563). Hundreds of years later, Carl Jung—the principal successor to Freud in the field of dream studies—referred to the “adumbratio (an anticipatory shadow)” said to mark the unanticipated approach of death (74). The Renaissance’s martyrological dreams supported this notion. William Hunter and John Bradford, both Protestant martyrs who were burned in the summer of 1555 and eulogized by Foxe, had fore-dreamed their deaths (Levin 65-68). In 1603, Shakespeare’s eminent contemporary Ben Jonson had a dream while visiting a friend in Huntingdonshire. Benjamin, his seven-year-old son, appeared in the dream with the “mark of a bloody cross on his forehead as if it had been cut with a sword” (qtd. in Levin 36). Although Jonson’s friend tried to talk him out of his nervous health, the following morning his wife wrote to him from London conveying the disastrous news of his son’s death in the plague. Francis Bacon, reputed for his rational and empiricist mind, referred to dreams as superstitions in his book *Novum Organum* (1620). Even he recounted having dreamed in Paris of his father’s country house being “plastered all over with black mortar”; this was two days before his father died in London (qtd. in Levin 36). There were also myths like that of Alexander the Great having dreamed of his mother Olympias at the very instant that she died, although historically it is well known that Olympias “survived her son by seven years” (Levin 36).

Well into the seventeenth century, dreams were also considered to be daemonic works that disseminated “sin, delusion and heresy” (Rivière 134). Besides arising from food and drink, dreams were said to proceed “from the constitution of the heavens, or dispositions of the air, or from previous cogitations, or from the temper of the body, or from the affection of the mind, or from the procuration of the devil, and only some few from the operation of good angels,” as postulated by the Restoration clergyman, Isaac Ambrose (516). By the 1590s an anthropogenic or secular theory of dreams also emerged. Galenic humours—phlegmatic, bilious, melancholic or sanguine—were considered as the material causes of dreaming, repositioning dreams as microcosms of psychic health. Even while denouncing them, Nashe had earlier hinted at dreams as being residues of waking experiences. In the early 1600s this view also gained momentum as England turned to a rudimentary continuity hypothesis of dreaming: that waking experiences and ailments influenced dreams. Medically oriented texts like Timothy Bright’s *A Treatise of Melancholie* (1586) and Robert Burton’s *The Anatomy of Melancholy* (1621)
linked fearful dreams to melancholia, that originated in the spleen, and was one of the most prominent humours to capture the Renaissance imagination. According to the humoral theory, investigating dreaming patterns could determine how much the “‘humours’ of the body were out of alignment” (Levin 41-42). In this sense, theories and representations of Renaissance dreams are reservoirs of early modern notions of psychological and physical health. Writings from the time also suggest that seventeenth-century England was opening up to a democratization of dream analysis. Thomas Walkington’s *Optick Glasse of Humours* (1607)—believed by some to have influenced Burton’s *Anatomy* (Mullett 96)—offered a Renaissance equivalent of modern-day dream guide books. It supplemented the Galenic model of humours by classifying dream symbology as fatal, unproductive and natural:

The first [dream] foretold; the second was fantasy; the third arose from one’s complexion. The choleric man dreamed of fireworks, comets, and stabbing; the sanguine man, “of beautiful women, of flowing streames;” the phlegmatic man, of water; and the melancholy man, of dark places and suicide. Dreams resulted from bad diet, overdrinking, and other excesses. Those desirous of quenching their thirst more on this point should, said Walkington, “repaire to the fountaines, I meane to the plentifull writings of such learned authors, as write of dreams more copiously.” (Mullett 101)

Published first in 1623, two years after Burton’s *Anatomy*, Owen Felltham’s popular book *Resolves: Divine, Moral, Political* came closest to the role of dreams that Shakespeare was propagating on stage: that of metacognition. Felltham himself referred to Calpurnia’s prophetic dream about Julius Caesar, from Shakespeare’s eponymous play. “Dreams are notable means of discovering our own inclinations,” remarked Felltham; the wise “learns to know himself as well by the night’s black mantle, as the searching beams of the day” (82). The wise, he added, became wiser for their dreams, and only through diligent examination of dream contents could one sift the unimportant dreams from the important signs. He maintained that although physicians may or may not be able to judge the state of bodily health, spiritual health could certainly be discerned from dreams. Although he resolved not to presage from dreams, he believed that observing them could “preserve health
or amend the life” (83). Felltham’s successor in the metacognition theory was the physician, philosopher and scholar of dreams, Sir Thomas Browne. If only dreams could be more easily recalled, he would have dedicated his entire scholarship to them. Browne believed dreams to be spiritual communications and astrological signs. Being serious about enabling dreamers to ascertain the meanings and implications of their dreams, he studied them in *Religio Medici, Pseudodoxia Epidemica, Plaints in Scripture* and *On Dreams*, among others. In Browne’s conception—as also observed in the *Mandukya Upanishad* from nondualist standpoints of ancient Indian philosophy (Indich 59-85)—dreams resembled “an elevated performance, somewhere between those mysterious yet ‘outward sensible motions’ produced by church ornament and ceremony at which he kneels, and the ordered and witty surprise served up by a good Fletcherian comedy played extempore for a private audience of one in the theatre of his bed” (Barbour 116). Browne advised utmost caution in dream interpretation, since dreams were amenable to fictions and falsehoods. Yet, he, along with his contemporary, the diarist Samuel Pepys, is regarded among the most prominent lucid dreamers of the late Renaissance (Wallace and Hodel x). Like martyrological, daemonic and Galenic discourses, this spiritual angle to dream phenomenology and interpretation also derived from the Elizabethan zeitgeist, which was itself affected by Shakespeare’s aphorisms like “All the world’s a stage, / And all the men and women merely players” (1718) or “We are such stuff. As dreams are made on; and our little life / Is rounded with a sleep” (3118)—from *As You Like It* and *The Tempest*, respectively. If the restless Renaissance spirit reflected astonishing fusions of mathematics, astronomy, alchemy, medicine and philosophy from Greco-Roman antiquity, prodigies of the Islamic world, and ancient Chinese and Indian traditions, the spirit of Renaissance dreams was restlessly reshaped by the inner lives of Shakespeare’s characters on a stage that dramatized and internalized many of those themes.

The metacognition theory of Felltham and Browne marks an important threshold in Renaissance oneirology. Both de-stigmatize dreaming. Both try to locate an ineffable spiritual role of dreaming as another dimension of reality, where the individual could experience dissociation from the waking cogito, observe it from outside, as it were, through lucid dreaming techniques, and experience dreams not necessarily through theological, political or medical dogmas but as self-mirroring tools. Their elementary experiments in lucid
dreaming defied the accepted notion that dreams were entirely unconscious phenomena—where dreamers had no autonomy—and must therefore be perpetually fallible. The Aristotelian theory of catharsis was still a high moral ground in dramaturgy. Thus, there was little reason to discredit the symbolic possibility that dreams could also bring about purgation, with an affirmative impact on the dreamer’s humoral disposition. Of course, this is simpler said than done. Research into lucid dreaming and therapeutic impact of ancient practices like Tibetan hypnagogic hallucinations and Eastern dream meditation techniques are still new. Although lucid dreams are not controversial phenomena—about fifty percent of people acknowledge experiencing lucid dreams at least once in their lives (Stumbrys and Erlacher, “Science” 77)—their possibility itself does not support the therapeutic value of Renaissance metacognition theory or the performative theory of dreams. However, Felltham and Browne proposed a significant paradigmatic shift against the prejudicial view that dreams merely represented remnants of quotidian life and challenged the predominant martyrological, heretical, theological, political and medical regimes of dream interpretation.

Felltham and Browne help bridge the metacognitive aspects of Renaissance dream theory with the method of group dream work proposed by twentieth-century psychotherapist Montague Ullman. Ullman borrowed the notion of dream work from Freud and Jung, before simplifying many of the clinical procedures of dream analysis. For Freud, dreams overlay innate censor mechanisms; they were symbolic expressions of repressed psychosexual content. Jung challenged Freud’s emphasis on sexual repression and instead theorized dream meaning in terms of archetypes emanating from a collective unconscious shared by individuals, societies and cultures. Ullman compared Freud’s focus on latent psychic tensions in the personal unconscious to Jung’s holistic view of the dream state as a shadow or complementary penumbra of waking life. Ullman (like Jung) believed that, in one sense, “the dream was a communication to the self”; its functions could be analyzed from its manifest contents without a roundabout recourse to latent repression or etiology (120). He developed his observations in clinical psychology into a group dream sharing technique, which became popular in the 1970s and 80s. The Ullman method aimed to provide an opportunity for the dreamer to speak about the dream without any judgment, stigmatization or strict format before a group of listeners (dream workers), who would subsequently be invited to offer their
aesthetic responses to the dream as if it were their own. The technique stimulated “a deep and powerful sense of relatedness to others, enabling people to recognize a shared humanity in the midst of social and cultural differences” (Bulkeley, “Dream-Sharing Groups” 65). Ullman intended to fill in “holes” in the emotional development of the individual and thus restore a sense of holism in the dreamer:

[W]e humans have learned how to use the accompanying psychological state, i.e., dreaming, to confront ourselves with images that can be found on awakening to have specific meaning for the individual dreamer. What we refer to as the dream is a waking remembrance of the dreaming experience. It is now available for use in the waking state but the use we put it to must not be misinterpreted as its intended function . . . . We simply have become clever enough to learn how to use the dream to the advantage of our waking adaptation. (121)

Jung, Ullman, and later psychologists recognized therapeutic value in the discourses, digressions and solecisms that dream work provides. Not only manifest dream contents, but even the discursive routes taken by a dreamer to rearticulate a dream offer valid therapeutic grounds. One may not necessarily come to know the meaning of a dream, or whether dreams indeed have detectable meanings. Yet, the total dream work is an auto-therapeutic technique, even a community-driven psychotherapeutic technique, in the Ullman method. It empowers the dreamer with a sense of autonomy over hidden psychic elements. Felltham and Browne, as well as Ullman, acknowledged the problem of misinterpretation of dreams, but Ullman especially recognized the dream work’s overriding therapeutic potential in a holistic program of psychotherapy.

The subsequent sections will argue that a therapeutic dream work is fulfilled in the dreams of Bottom, Cleopatra and Caliban. The argument implies that we redefine dream experience as the sum-total phenomenology of dream recall, the language of dream work, and the holistic performance of recounting and discoursing on the cognitive and affective data of the dream performed on the stage of sleep.
III. Cleopatra and the Alexandrine Oneirotopia

Michel Foucault’s concept heterotopia—the simultaneity of heterogeneous topographies, for instance in a library, a mirror, a garden, a museum, et al.—that has found application in a wide range of studies, from literary and cinematic criticism to urban planning and architecture, is yet to be substantively put to psychological studies. From the standpoint of analyzing formal aspects of literary dreams, it would be useful to classify dream spaces as oneirotopias. Oneirotopias work not only as dream introjections of waking experience, but also as theatrically projected external realities, such as the topography of the Athenian woods in *A Midsummer Night’s Dream*, Ptolemaic Alexandria in *Antony and Cleopatra*, and the uninhabited Mediterranean islands in *The Tempest*, which are explicitly structured like dreams.

In *Antony and Cleopatra*, Enobarbus’ description of Cleopatra is nothing short of a pageant witnessed in a dream, as Browne would have corroborated in his recognition of the dramaturgical aspect of dreams. To Enobarbus, Cleopatra’s barge is “a burnished throne”; its rear plated with gold, burning the surface of the Nile. The sails are purple and “so perfumed” that they leave the winds lovelorn in their passage. The barge is advanced by silver oars which ply like wind instruments. Seeing Cleopatra seated inside her pavilion, guarded by a curtain of golden gossamer, is itself a “fancy” which rivals natural wonders (Shakespeare 2593). Her female consorts wait on her like “Nereides” or mermaids (2593), tending to her eyes, while the silken sails resonate in the breeze, oozing a mellifluous scent, heaving the senses of bystanders on the wharf. Escorted by her cupid-like band of boys wielding polychromatic fans, Cleopatra appears like Venus in a vision, when she appears in our imagination for the first time. Her manner alchemizes defect to perfection; her breathlessness exudes breath to the gasping spectator (2593-94). Being the visible personification of absolute performance in beauty and power, Cleopatra herself is the Roman dream, which when dreamed by her—in the form of Antony—is “past the size of dreaming” (2650), without letting on if it is her latent innocence or defiance in the face of death. Enobarbus’ speech in act 2, scene 2, valorizing the ethereal advent of Cleopatra’s train is the very “stuff” that nature brings “[t]o vie strange forms with fancy” (2650), as her dream work in act 5, scene 2, provides the obverse of Rome’s imperial dreams. The Antony of her dreams has a face like the “heav’ns,” anchored by celestial bodies which
illumine the earth below (2649). His legs—like Caesar’s colossal feet in Cassius’ fancy, from *Julius Caesar*—bestride the ocean, and his arm embraces the earth. His voice reverberates like the gentle music of the galaxies before friends; before enemies, it bursts and rattles like thunder. His benevolence has no “winter in’t”; its autumn harvests multiply (2649). If Cleopatra’s attendants are mermaid-like, Antony is an untroubled dolphin, towering over his aqueous habitat. If Cleopatra’s barge is an exotic Alexandrine microcosm, Antony’s robes are the abodes of “crowns and crownets” and “Realms and islands,” which, if they happened to drop from his pockets, would scarce be noticed by their landlord (2649). This is not Shakespeare’s finest poetical achievement; what might be, however, is that Cleopatra’s dream of Antony follows his death and precedes her own, and that it is the imperial lord Octavius Caesar who ironically acknowledges Cleopatra’s suicidal rest as her “sleep” wherein to “catch another Antony” (2656).

“Sicknes” is a subtle though recurrent theme in *Antony and Cleopatra*. Fulvia’s prolonged sickness and subsequent death becomes the ruse for Antony to marry Octavia (the sister of Octavius), and thereby honor a political pact. But a lovesick Antony leaves Rome and Octavia to reunite with Cleopatra. The wind that is wafted by the sails of Cleopatra’s barge is itself reported by Enobarbus to be “love-sick” (Shakespeare 2593). Antony’s lovesickness becomes a point of embarrassment for Enobarbus, when he feels his eyes “sicken at the sight” of Antony’s defeat against Octavius Caesar’s forces (2618). Cleopatra is prepared to feign sickness in order to seduce Antony back to her seraglio. “I am sick and sullen,” she tells Antony the moment he enters (2579). The Italian civil war plaguing Antony’s kingdom is a consequence of Roman factions, “grown sick of rest” and incumbency, defecting to Pompey’s camp (2580). The overarching sickness of the play, if seen through Cleopatra’s eyes, is Roman imperial ideology. Cleopatra’s ideology, on the other hand, is oneirological. Dreaming is her idea of an antidote; she dreams to defy worldly dimensions. Her “Anthony is Mars and Bacchus in one, a new Hercules, the ‘triple pillar of the world’ whose ‘legs bestrid the ocean’; Cleopatra an avatar of Isis, and a mortal Venus whose image, like his, outworks nature itself” (Neill 4). Yet, after the death of her lover, Cleopatra has much to heal from besides just that. In a model metareferential turn, Shakespeare lets Cleopatra voice her grudge against the very playwright who dramatizes her love story over a millennium after her death. Cleopatra’s most serious malady is that she finds herself—a “woman”—
at the helm of the coveted Alexandrine empire and as the cynosure of all eyes in a line of ageing Roman monarchists. “The quick comedians,” she remarks moments before her suicide, “Extemporally will stage us and present / Our Alexandrian revels. Antony / Shall be brought drunken forth, and I shall see / Some squeaking Cleopatra boy my greatness / I’ th’ posture of a whore” (Shakespeare 2653). Not paradoxically, the psychotherapeutic value of her dream brings her closer to death, making it all the more serene for her. It also brings her dream closer to Browne’s notions of oneiric performativity. If the Roman dream is constituted by the highly eroticized contours of Cleopatra’s feminine identity and feminized empire, her dream is subversively geared towards carving an Olympian oneirotopia for herself, where she can cohabit with Antony, inflating his much-weakened stature at her will. Since her waking reality is consumed by Roman imperial dreams, Cleopatra repudiates it for her final oneirotopic journey, becoming indistinct from her dream Antony in a posthumous materialization of his resonant words: “As water is in water” (2639).

Cleopatra does not share her dream with any consort or confidante; it is Dolabella, the Roman consul under Octavius Caesar, whom she trusts with it. “You laugh when boys or women tell their dreams,” she taunts, when a well-meant Dolabella comes to warn her that Caesar intends to march her on the streets of Rome as his trophy (Shakespeare 2649). Like Caesar’s imperialism, dream theory in Shakespeare’s time was a highly gendered and patriarchal project, as reports of men’s dreams outnumbered women’s by about twenty-five to one, or more. Until about the eighteenth century, dream theory “catered to a predominantly male audience,” in most recorded dreams “the default dreamer being male” (Rivière 72). But as Michael MacDonald suggests in his study of Richard Napier—a controversial Anglican astrologer and part-time physician around Shakespeare’s time—there was more to the story (245). Accordingly, Napier kept several diaries to record the psychological symptoms of his patients, which suggest that about ten percent of his male and seven percent of female patients reported “fancies”; one percent each reported Satanic “visions”—both fancy and vision being referents for hallucinatory or dreamlike activity (MacDonald 245). Three percent each also reported explicitly terrifying dreams. Both reported other kinds of dreams and fancies as well (245). Although based on a small sample of about 2,000 patients, Napier’s records suggest that there was much less gender bias in dream phenomena as it occurred...
in nature than what was reported in dream manuals and guidebooks. While women were often subjects in male dreams, fantasies and nightmares, the abject position of women in the mainstream Elizabethan dreamscape better explains Cleopatra’s cynical stance, as well as Shakespeare’s recognition of her abjection.

Shakespeare’s Cleopatra is not merely an Alexandrine empress; she is an Elizabethan heroine, tragically cast as a young boy on the sixteenth-century stage (when women actors were outlawed). Her oneirotopia may seem trivial to a Roman imperialist, but when the Elizabethan audience saw its onstage reportage, the idea of a posthumous communion between Cleopatra and Antony would have crossed their minds, teasing at the same time the thought of dreams being a vestibule to resuscitate communion with dead ancestors. The Reformation had unleashed a century of religious assaults on Catholic tombs, the dismembering of gravestones, fabrication of “counter memory” and a cultural amnesia that progressively denuded links with the past and ancestral links (Marshall 123). Poet Robert Herrick remarked that “dreams often rip us from the social hierarchy and even from the cosmic whole that lend our human experience its most reliable sanctity” (qtd. in Barbour 116). The power to dream, and to dream of theologically banished ancestors, belonged to everyone without religious or social distinctions and prohibitions. Dreams were precious media for Elizabethans to reestablish contemplative, affective and commemorative communion with their ancestors, without making public their religious and cultural markers. Cleopatra’s oneirotopia was a dream example for possible communitarian healing from the traumas of Tudor revenge spectacles and violent banishment of Catholic—and later Protestant—ancestral links and mourning rituals.

Cleopatra’s is the first complex dream in the Shakespearean dreamscape without any prognosticative function. Recently, the Shakespearean stage has been called “an archive of dreams” (Chatterjee, “Shakespeare” 99-101). In the second book of *Henry VI*, while the Duke of Gloucester dreams of his “staff” dismembered by the cardinal, with the heads of Dukes of Somerset and Suffolk attached to its broken ends, his wife Elenor dreams of a “seat of majesty” in Westminster Abbey (Shakespeare 261-62). In *Richard III*, the Duke of Clarence dreams of an excruciating underwater death prolonged by “dreadful noise of waters,” saw “ugly sights of death,” “a thousand fearful wrecks,” corpses being gnawed on by fishes beside sunken treasures buried in sockets of skulls, and so
on (569). Later, Richard dreams of his ancestors, relatives, friends and victims, who appear in a line, promising to “sit heavy” on his conscience in the battlefield (631-32). Romeo dreams of dying and his corpse being found by Juliet, who revives it with her kisses. Calpurnia dreams of Caesar having become a fountain for quenching the bloodthirst of Romans, while Cinna the poet dreams of dining with Caesar, the night before Caesar is assassinated and Cinna himself is burned by the confused mob. Queen Katherine in Henry VIII foredreams her death, while Antigonus is warned of his in a dream in The Winter’s Tale. In Pericles, the titular hero dreams of Goddess Diana; in Cymbeline, Posthumus dreams of Jupiter; and in the first book of Henry VI, Joan of Arc dreams of Virgin Mary. Where death and destruction are dreamed, death and destruction follow; where benediction is promised, the promise is fulfilled.

Elements of the above dreamscape fulfil formal roles in the plot, while functioning as camera lucidas to disclose the psychic lives of characters. But Cleopatra’s dream performs predominantly the latter role; doing so, it heightens the plot. Although Antony may be said to have been resurrected in a Platonic afterlife of sorts, in Cleopatra’s dream, he is not revived on stage, nor does the dream portend any event to follow. The ultimate drive of Cleopatra’s dream of Antony’s colossally magnified imago is to place him, albeit posthumously, on a footing equal to her perceived image; the grandiose Egyptian seductress of Roman fancy. Besides healing herself of the trauma of Antony’s death, in dissociating herself from her waking reality in a lucid-dreamlike state, she salvages the noble love story of Antony and Cleopatra, taking it to her grave. Explicit records of Cleopatra’s real dreams are unknown. Yet, Shakespeare accords her the rights of her dream work as a therapeutic tool. Her discourse will then be passed on as a performative anecdote by Dolabella to Caesar, to historians of imperial Rome, whose successors became historical sources for the Bard of Avon. When a “squeaking Cleopatra boy” would reperform Cleopatra’s dream on the Shakespearean stage, the Ullman dream work method would have uncannily come full circle, way before its own time.

IV. “Expounding” the Subaltern Dreamscape

Contrary to popular sentiment, A Midsummer Night’s Dream has very few manifest dreams or dream reports, although it is an exemplar of Shakespearean
oneirology. Hermia’s quaking sensation of a “crawling serpent” on her ribs is followed by a dream reportage where she recalls how the serpent ate her heart while her lover Lysander sat by idly (Shakespeare 1102). Puck’s dream potion is anticipated here. Derived from the flower called love-in-idleness, the potion, when applied to a sleeper’s eyes, influences the senses, upon waking, to fall in love with the first character they behold. On account of the potion, Hermia’s lovers Lysander and Demetrius are infatuated with Helena; Helena, on the other hand, loves Demetrius. Oberon’s wife Titania is madly infatuated with Nick Bottom, the Athenian weaver. These romantic subplots are all dreamlike sequences, although not unfolding as sleep-state dreams. The therapeutic function of dreaming is at play throughout. Titania’s sleep is described by Oberon as the “fierce vexation of a dream” (1119). She recalls having fallen in love with an “ass” (Bottom dressed in a donkey’s bust), whose name and avatar yields polyphonic meanings, mostly burlesque and bordering on the obscene—“bottom” meaning anus (or ass), therefore, “Nick Bottom” implying someone who has nicked an ass (donkey or anus), etc. It is this comical character who reports what may well be the only dream in the Shakespearean dreamscape constated without any reportable contents but only ribald discursive excess.

If Cleopatra’s dream Antony is “past the size” of nature (Shakespeare 2650), Bottom’s “most rare vision” is past description, as it is well “past the wit of man” (1123). Bottom’s dream work is a deferred promissory note; it “hath no bottom” (without an ass?) or without Bottom being present in it, except as his own shadow, in the form of a donkey (1123). In Bottom’s dream discourse, “man is but an ass, if he go about to expound this dream” (1123); Bottom is the ass in his dream. Yet, having come out of the bottomless reverie, he is restored to his Bottom-hood, as it were. His self-parodic nonsense—“Methought I was, and methought I had”—adds to the absurdity, if also the profundity of his dream work (1122-23). The lewd hermeneutics of Bottom’s name is inescapable. However, if we also focus on the opinion that Shakespeare took Bottom’s surname from the weavers’ term “a bottom thread” and his given name, Nick, from the “favorite Christian name for weavers” (Stroup 79-80), then more serious implications arise, more pertinent to the totality of the Shakespearean dreamscape. Nick’s dream is bottomless, perhaps, also because it has transported him “out of his lowly self”; his simplicity becomes “enviable rather than ludicrous” (Miller 268).
Of the six dreamers in the play, it is Bottom who strongly resists dream analysis. Thus, “we may expect to find in his dream the hidden nucleus of the material that Shakespeare, Bottom’s creator, worked into the *Midsummer-Night’s Dream*” (Gui 253). If Cleopatra’s Alexandrine dream work is reproduced by Shakespeare in Elizabethan England, the Bard leads Bottom to choose his friend Peter Quince as the balladeer of his dream work, prospectively titled “Bottom’s Dream” (Shakespeare 1123). Nick Bottom’s “dream” love affair with Titania mimics his infantile fantasies (Gui 259-72). The play reconfigures Bottom as the physically vulnerable but erotically charged son, with Titania as the imago of an eroticized mother. If indeed so, Oberon represents the rival sibling in this Freudian triangulation. But, besides this classical psychoanalytic angle, Bottom’s bottomless dream adds to the oneiric intertextuality of the Shakespearean dreamscape. The depth of Bottom’s dream rivals the bottomless deep into which Clarence (in *Richard III*) is drowned in his dream, or where Ferdinand (in *The Tempest*) is led to believe his father lies buried; just as Puck’s love potion recalls Brabantio’s accusation that Othello has, by means of “some dram conjured,” bewitched Desdemona with the effects of an infatuation (Shakespeare 2125-26; Armstrong 73-74). Seen in a Jungian discourse, the oneirotopic world is complementary to waking realities and is a shadow of the latter. Additionally, symbols of dreaming and waking realities from Shakespearean lives cast their shadows on dreams of other characters. For instance, Bottom is Oberon’s shadow; if Oberon signifies marvelous heights, Bottom stands for beginningless depths; if Bottom lives by weaving, Oberon fabricates a gossamer stage in the Athenian woods, where his fetishes are casted with the help of Puck. Since Bottom enacts his dream within Oberon’s fantasy—which unfolds within Shakespeare’s titular *Dream*—it is natural that the weaver cannot wholly assert agency over his dream work. Yet, Bottom’s sheer determination to recount his dream and have it inscribed is unique in the Shakespearean dreamscape, besides the fact that it is the only manifest dream reportage in all of Shakespeare whose contents are forgotten, and whose impact is endlessly deferred. Puck’s epilogue, likening the play itself to “a dream” (Shakespeare 1134), reinscribes the value of Bottom’s dream work. Bottom’s dream is not entirely his own, yet seems to follow the Ullman method all along. Ullman’s dream work was designed on the principle of transpersonal subjective dream discourse based on dreams of others, taken up by a group for fluid interpretation, with the prompt, *if this were my dream*. That Bottom cannot
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recount his dream does not make him a failure; that he so desperately tries to reenact Oberon’s fantasy, makes him Shakespeare’s transpersonal subjective discoursor on dreams—a prototype of twentieth-century participants in the Ullman method. Bottom is more than a scapegoat whom Oberon uses to recuperate from his psychosexual marital insecurity by planting seeds of infatuation between Titania and the weaver. Bottom is a subaltern who cautions us about the fatal ends of Shakespearean monarchs—from the Henriad and Julius Caesar—who go about conceiving or expounding macabre prognosticative dreams, never straying from the path of unredeemable doom.

Bottom’s subaltern dream is echoed in Caliban’s reverie from The Tempest. Caliban is the shadow of Prospero, who acknowledges the “thing of darkness” as his responsibility towards the end of the play (Shakespeare 3129). The Tempest, which has been often read as an allegory of English colonialism, is not merely a tale of Prospero’s imperial genius (or camouflaged treachery). It is also a saga of the survival of Caliban, who appears marginal in the plot, except for powerful dialogues and dream reportage. The political afterlife of Shakespeare’s Caliban is deeply impressive, especially in New Historicist criticism (Chatterjee, “Performing” 62-71). The Mediterranean islander has been resurrected as a beacon of hope for African American historiography and subaltern voices around the world. Caliban’s dream acquires great political and even therapeutic importance, especially in the light of the Black Lives Matter movement. In exchange of his curses, Prospero threatens to have him cramped up with “[s]ide-stitches that shall pen thy breath up,” and order urchins to pinch him into something “[a]s thick as honeycomb, each pinch more stinging / Than bees that made ‘em” (Shakespeare 3084). Caliban’s dreaded condition—which we do not see on stage but imagine—brings eerie echoes of the slogan of the Black Lives Matter movement, “I can’t breathe,” known to be the last words of Eric Garner and George Floyd, Black American citizens who were killed by forcible restraint in police custody, in 2014 and 2020, respectively, and whose deaths have been ruled as homicide and manslaughter. Reportedly, “I can’t breathe” were also the last words uttered by Christopher Lowe, Javier Ambler II, Derrick Scott, Byron Williams, John Neville and Manuel Ellis, who died in police custody between 2018 and 2019. Furthermore, the unconventionality of Caliban’s dream work (no prognostication, no adumbratio, no explicit link to the plot except as data of the sublime beauty of what is supposedly Prospero’s island) makes it exceptional in the Shakespearean dreamscape. Stephano, who
is lost in the island, comes across Caliban, whom he takes for an Indian “savage” or “fish” (3100). The dehumanization of Caliban is at sharp odds with his highly evolved and animistic oneirotopia. Caliban shows the way to Stephano—the seemingly civilized subject and civilizing agent—and urges him not to fear the vagaries of the island:

Be not afeard; the isle is full of noises,  
Sounds and sweet airs, that give delight and hurt not.  
Sometimes a thousand twangling instruments  
Will hum about mine ears, and sometime voices  
That, if I then had waked after long sleep,  
Will make me sleep again: and then, in dreaming,  
The clouds methought would open and show riches  
Ready to drop upon me that, when I waked,  
I cried to dream again. (3109)

To interpret Caliban’s dream for its precise therapeutic value is a steep task. We are faced with the argument that the dream is not “the antithesis but the apotheosis” of Prospero’s colonial control over an enslaved subject (Brown 66). Unbeknownst to Caliban (so the argument goes), Prospero has cast a spell over every creature and corner of Sycorax’s island, including Caliban. Caliban is to Prospero as Bottom is to Oberon: colonized dreamer and dreaming colony. Considered as an example of Prospero’s “social engineering, the dream-text is hypnosis, the script the master’s” (Palfrey 184). Thus, Caliban’s oneiric melodies are “the enslaving means of production, a mollifying opiate, an interpellation into obedience, dressed up as choice” (184). Such an argument leads to the hasty conclusion that Caliban has no free will. It overlooks a deeply relevant piece of evidence: Caliban’s metamorphosis from a subaltern performer to a performer of subalternity.

When John Keats turned to The Tempest as an inspiration for Endymion (1818), Caliban’s language impressed him the most. Facing strong criticism for the unnatural over-eloquent style of Endymion, Keats wanted his critics to “prove that Caliban’s poetry is unnatural” (95). The young poet trusted Shakespeare as much as he wagered on Caliban’s poetical talents (White 96-100). Here, the valorization of Caliban’s dream work is not simply to compensate for Keats’ literary misfortunes, nor due to the possibility that since
Keats was trained as an apothecary, he probably recognized some inherent therapeutic value in the subaltern dream. Rather, it is simply because Keats is a rightful votary of Caliban’s poetry, as much as Shakespeare’s postcolonial critics.

Having learned his language from Prospero and Miranda, Caliban profits from it by learning how to curse. He also learns how to manipulate (or abuse) the metaphorical qualities of that language for his own salvation. After serving Prospero all his life, Caliban shifts allegiance to Stephano, his “wondrous man,” whom he promises to pluck berries for, fish for, lumber for, hunt crabs for and dig peanuts for with his long nails (Shakespeare 3103). Caliban promises Stephano that he will “[s]how thee a jay’s nest and instruct thee how / To snare the nimble marmoset; I’ll bring thee / To clustering filberts and sometimes I’ll get thee / Young scamels from the rock” (3103). It is no trifle that Caliban so evocatively reproduces the wizard Gonzalo’s vision of nature’s plenty; it is indeed moot that the “drunken monster,” appearing as Prospero’s slave, can also seduce with promises “that an English boy would find in his native hedgerows and copses” (Mincoff 108). Though enslaved and disempowered, Caliban’s textual felicity over his mother’s island (now colonized by Prospero), in Prospero’s language, by exploiting Prospero’s dream, paves the way for a subversive (Calibanesque) politics. It would be churlish to deny him that free will, the will to perform by exaggeration, just as it would be to deny his dream the intertextuality with dying Cleopatra’s magnification of dead Antony in a dream.

Like Roman imperialism severs Antony from Cleopatra, Prospero’s colonial discourse discredits Caliban’s rights over his mother’s island; like Cleopatra envisions Antony in an oneiric language (likely to be appropriated by Roman ideologues), Caliban’s dream (despite its colonially engineered appropriability) creates a subliminal therapeutic space wherein to articulate his dream work. Like Cleopatra’s dream symbolizes Antony as lofty galactic elements, Caliban recreates his island in churchlike organ melody and animistic clouds. Like Cleopatra’s dream promises nothing but her liberation, Caliban’s dream work stands as testimony to his linguistic autonomy over dreams, if not language itself. Caliban is perceived as a subaltern in Prospero’s regime. Rightly so. But so is Bottom. Yet, like Cleopatra’s dream, theirs cannot be appropriated in a colonial/anticolonial binary. Their oneirotopias pave new spaces to reimagine the Elizabethan dreamscape by virtue of Shakespearean
dreams. Caliban’s dream represents a promise of liberation from his subjugation and, on a deeper neurocognitive level, a channel of metacognition. These roles are fulfilled regardless of which language he reports it in, as long as it enlightens him, and us, about his changing relationship to the island and its colonial master. If Bottom’s dream is bottomless, Caliban’s dream pierces the sky. And, if Puck tells the audience of *A Midsummer Night’s Dream* that the “shadows” and characters of the play are “[n]o more yielding but a dream” (Shakespeare 1134), Prospero, at the end of *The Tempest*, testifies to the “baseless fabric of this vision,” “this insubstantial pageant,” that shall “[l]eave not a rack behind” (3118).

If the Shakespearean stage was the Elizabethan audience’s dream world (*oneirotopia*), the dream works of his characters were politically subversive, if also therapeutic; the two were never mutually incompatible.

V. The Ullman Method in Shakespearean Dreams

Plainly observable, the Ullman method is at work in the dreams of Cleopatra, Bottom and Caliban. For Ullman, aspects that make dreaming available “for healing purposes in the waking state derive from both the form that consciousness takes at the time and the content which is being expressed” (122). Dreaming enables the exploration of “emotional residue” from waking experiences, and the subconscious observation of it in relation to our collective emotional landscape (122). Twenty-first century oneirology has assembled a large body of dream data suggesting strong correlations between dreaming patterns and mental health, while a new entrant into dream studies is the aspect of lucid dreaming as case studies of nonpharmacological dreams supervised by researchers (Stumbrys and Erlacher, “Applications” 77-102). For REM sleep dreams, modern oneirology postulates a continuity hypothesis that waking state memories influence dreams, which influence waking state qualia and moods.² The threat simulation and social simulation theories of dreaming suggest that dreams are a threat-avoidance rehearsal for potentially hazardous life situations, or simulations for the development of social skills, respectively, which makes them appear as invested with an evolutionary role.³ Finally, it has also been

² Please see Schredl, “Factors” 1-5; Schredl and Reinhard, 271-82; Schredl, “Characteristics” 135-54; Erlacher et al. 309-13.
³ Please see Revonsuo 877-1121; Franklin and Zyphur 59-78; Revonsuo et al., 1-28; Tuominen et al. 133-45.
suggested that creative problem solving could be yet another evolutionary or adaptative role of dreams (Barrett, *Committee* 120; Barrett, “Evolutionary Theory” 133-54).

Ullman’s purpose was not necessarily to study any adaptive function of dreaming. Instead, he was keen to examine the role of “remote memory” in shaping “emotionally contiguous experiences” in the present (Ullman 122). He believed that in dream states and dream work that relationship can be observed without the inhibitions that modify waking state realities. As opposed to the Elizabethan notion of the unreliability of dreams or the Freudian notion of dreams as censor mechanisms, Ullman reckoned dreams to be a “profoundly honest account” of the individual’s past and present; their contents to be “the ingredients of a subsequent healing experience, namely, the linking of present and past, the bringing of more information to bear on a current issue than is ordinarily available to us while awake and the tapping into a way of being truthful about ourselves” (122). Dream language is inherently different from common language. So, in the Ullman method, dreams are not perceived in direct correlation with waking experiences and linguistic expressions. The group dream work heals the dreamer emotionally by delving into a deeper unprejudiced truth, in what is sharply at odds with the Elizabethan cynicism towards dreams and Freudian quest for latent etiologies.

The essence of dream work is tapping into the potential we all have for being honest with ourselves. Dream images arise out of deeper informational sources than is ordinarily available to us. Furthermore, the information so obtained is reliable. It is these qualities of the imagery that makes their explication a healing experience. The result of dream work is a movement toward greater honesty and greater clarity, not about a trivial aspect of our life but rather, around an issue from our past that has intruded into the present in a way that has set up an unresolved tension . . . . Emotional healing, in contrast to physiological healing, takes place outside of the skin or physically defined limits of the person. It takes place as a consequence of changes that occur in an interpersonal field. Other people and our relationship to them is a prerequisite for emotional healing. Emotional difficulties start
with human beings and are resolved through human beings. Dream work proceeds in the context of an interpersonal field. (Ullman 127)

But even supposing the Ullman method as a new aesthetic model of psychotherapy, distinct from Elizabethan and Freudian orthodoxy, what does it mean to say that it is at work in the Shakespearean dreamscape? Who are the participants and what is the dream work? Besides, who is to say whether the characters are actually healed? Cleopatra dies; Bottom is just one of the many shadows lurking in the canon; Caliban dissolves like the rest of the characters! Their dreams, however, leave residues, not only as poetical metaphors and motifs, but also in their functional attributes. The dreams of Cleopatra, Bottom and Caliban do not have fixed, formal or local meanings within the plot, unlike the prognosticative dreams of Clarence, Eleanor, Richard, Calpurnia, Katherine and others. The nonlocality of their dreams reveals—more than manifest contents—the emotional landscapes of their psyche. While most Shakespearean dreams are performed before an audience as well as some other character, the performance of the dreams of Cleopatra, Bottom and Caliban does not end with the respective plays. In the Ullman method, we cannot take Shakespearean dream motifs to have predefined symbolic values, as critics usually do. We can only see them as symbols transcending “any limited set of meanings or interpretations” (Ullman 123). Consider the Elizabethan audience, faced with the crisis of ruptured theological dogmas and the erosion of personal practices of mourning, commemoration and ancestral links. For them to witness dreams being used as tools not necessarily of prognostication but also of dream-discourse, dream work and self-healing would have been radically empowering.

It was one thing for Doctor Browne to eruditely suggest that dreams were, among other things, private nocturnal performances; it was quite another for the same to be staged in the public space of an amphitheater, before an audience comprising nobility and commoners. Playhouses invariably reached a much larger audience than scholarly low print run books in Elizabethan England. Against that background, a prototypical dream work and the performative aspect of personal dreams were deeply embedded into the ethos of Shakespearean dreams. In a lecture on Shakespeare’s “Sleep and Dreams,” Carroll Camden remarked that when we come across “a passage in Shakespeare which does not immediately seem clear to the twentieth century mind, it is not
for us to sit in a corner and try to guess its meaning, or even to attempt to reason it out”; we must ask, instead, “what Shakespeare’s audience understood by the passage. For in the last analysis what the audience understood is what Shakespeare meant” (107). As if in response to this suggestion, Steven Mullaney adds, “How can we know what an Elizabethan audience thought or felt as they watched, heard, and responded to any given performance?”; we obviously cannot, not with absolute certainty, but that “does not mean, of course, that the question should not be asked” (61). So, while we cannot assert that Shakespeare anticipated the Ullman method, we can at least begin by tracing compatible grounds of psychological healing practices in the Shakespearean dreamscape and Ullman’s dream work, as both work by “releasing the dreamer’s own self-healing potential,” bringing one closer to a more uninhibited and unmasked version of oneself (Ullman 128). Salient features of the Ullman method include creating a safe “non-intrusive atmosphere” for the dreamer, respect for the dream and the dream work, without casting aspersions, and the lack of hierarchy between the clinician, dreamer and dream workers (128). Dreams may or may not be themselves demystified cogito certainly is. “The dreamer soon learns that the only thing of importance is the connection the dream has to a larger and more truthful version of the self . . . . [T]he dream comes to be looked upon as an available and helpful private resource” (129). While historical phenomenology and scientific historiography situate Shakespeare within sensorial, clinical and neuroscientific discourses, it is also crucial for us to recognize the latent strands of psychotherapy in the Shakespearean dreamscape; not only the politics and dream theory of his times, but also what changes he wrought therein. One of them certainly was a new psychotherapeutics of dream metacognition—the phenomena that King James had once labelled as “naturall sicknes,” denouncing them as sources of delusion and sin.

Shakespeare’s characters evidently oppose that. The oneirotopias of Cleopatra, Bottom and Caliban illustrate how deeply Shakespeare felt about the Renaissance’s emotional landscape, whether in the psyche of an Alexandrine empress (Cleopatra), a subaltern weaver (Bottom) or a drunken “monster” (Caliban). In the light of the Ullman method, the Shakespearean dreamscape reveals the anxieties of Renaissance oneirology to trace and articulate the etiology of dreams, which it could not wholly appropriate into either a divine
(metaphysical) or anthropogenic (secular or materialistic) discourse. For Shakespeare, the Elizabethan stage was a meeting ground between private traumas and collectivized spectacle. He used it phenomenally well to legitimize dream phenomena as perfectly natural and organic constituents of the processual sickness and health of the Renaissance mind.
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